Since the fall of man in the ‘Garden of Eden’, war has occupied a powerful place in humanity’s moral imagination. Though conflict appears repeatedly across history, it is never the same phenomenon twice, instead assuming forms shaped by distinct political, social, and cultural contexts. Many men have tried to master this beast of nature by bringing the subject of war into the intellectual spheres of the arts and sciences. Some of the most renowned in their efforts to do so include Carl von Clausewitz in his On War or to name another, Sun Tzu, in his famous work, the Art of War. While both have had a tremendous impact on military thought, it has remained Clausewitz’s throne when it comes to studying the nature of war in the Western world. The 19th century Prussian General was greatly influenced by the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) and they certainly helped mold the foundation of his book. Published shortly after his death in 1832, by his wife Marie von Clausewitz, who’s hand in its publication certainly shaped his legacy and the book we know today,[1] largely in that it was unfinished when he died, but historians such as Hew Strachan argue that is one of the books biggest strengths. How does a book primarily based on early 19th century warfare still hold weight today? Time and time again strategists and historians have called On War dead or ‘out of date,’[2] but always seems to find its way back to relevancy. This may largely be since Clausewitz discovered something remarkable about the nature of war that is timeless and can be applied to generations before and long after our current generation, and that is the ‘fascinating trinity’ of war. It is within this trinity where historians, politicians, generals etc., must tread to truly grasp what may be called the ‘Art of War’.
This paper will set out to explain how this ‘fascinating trinity’ that includes the points of passion, chance/probability and reason, can be applied to help deepen our understanding of two distinct wars (The War of Spanish Succession 1702-14 and The Great Northern War 1700-21), battles (Blenheim 1704 and Poltava 1709), and its generals (Duke of Marlborough and Charles XII of Sweden). While these conflicts and men resided in a generation over a hundred years before On War was published, Clausewitz’s trinity still holds value.[3] I will use the trinity to come to some conclusions about these infamous battles and generals, where it will help us navigate the complex nature of the wars, the battles, and these perceived men of ‘genius’.
Before we march any further, we must dive into the pool of the ‘fascinating trinity’ briefly to understand each of its points and how we will use them to help us understand the respective battles and generals under review. On War is a very in-depth account of the nature of war, and problems quickly arise based on the translation of the text. Scholars have translated Clausewitz’s famous trinity passage differently and it does have dramatic changes to the way we may understand it and use it. Many scholars use Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s translation,[4] however the growing dissatisfaction with the translation is part of a wider trend in the field of history when it comes to studying canonical texts. The belief is that the closer we get to the originality of the text, the closer we are to true enlightenment.[5] I will be using Christopher Bassford’s translation of the trinity passage because his particular word choices allow us to accurately use the trinity to understand our subject. His translation of the passage is below:
War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each concrete case. It is also, however, when it is regarded as a whole and in relation to the tendencies that dominate within it, a fascinating trinity—composed of:
(1) * primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;
(2) the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and
(3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.[6]
One of the most important aspects of Bassford’s definition is his distinction between Clausewitz’s use of the trinity metaphor as a new conceptual framework, rather than something interchangeable with the chameleon metaphor as translated by Howard and Paret. As Bassford explains, ‘the chameleon metaphor pointed to changes in war’s appearance from case to case; the trinity addresses the underlying forces that drive those changes.[7] This is important for us, since we will use the trinity to understand how Marlborough and Charles XII shaped the wars they fought, not merely to describe each war’s outward appearance.
Secondly, he switches out Howard and Paret’s use of the word ‘paradoxical’[8] to describe the trinity with ‘fascinating’, which I have been using since the beginning. He chose ‘fascinating’ because he believes it better reflects Clausewitz’s fascination with these points and how they continuously interact with another, ‘to the point of being mesmerized by it’.[9] I too like this word choice, because I think it helps us understand the nature of war itself and how it has caused men of the past and present to be particularly fascinated by it and in some cases mesmerized by generals who seem to have mastered its nature through ‘victory’ in battle as if it were a work of art.
Lastly, we will briefly cover each point of the trinity and what it means for our purposes going forward. The first point we will shorten to passion as I believe it represents the concept of ‘the blind natural force’ and emphasizes that the violence Clausewitz is describing is more than just physical, but rather raw emotions such as hatred, which can act as a motive force in war. We will look primarily at the personalities of Marlborough and Charles XII when discussing this point, and how their personal passions influenced the outcomes of their battles.
The second point, I will shorten to chance/probability. However, they are two distinct things, chance being ‘arbitrary and incalculable’, like unusual weather, and probability will be used to ‘refer things whose likelihood can be to some extent estimated’,[10] like the handling of logistics and tactical planning. We will be using this point to examine how the battles of Blenheim and Poltava were shaped by these acts of chance/probability and how their generals reacted or planned for them.
The third point I will shorten to reason, but this will primarily highlight how both the governments and the actions of Marlborough and Charles impacted the battles and wars through specific strategies or rather ‘reason’. The word ‘policy’ in this point is important because it is not to be interpreted simply as distinct from ‘politics’; rather, they interplay with each other. As Bassford explains, ‘policy, in contrast to politics, is unilateral and rational… Policy represents a conscious effort by one entity in the political arena to bend its own power to the accomplishment of some purpose’.[11]
While each of these three points may seem isolated at first, they are in fact, as we will see in both battles, constantly interplaying with each other, sometimes strengthening or weakening one another. Thus, we will try to keep our analysis of these battles and men, ‘floating among these three tendencies, as among three points of attraction’, as Bassford’s translation of Clausewitz lays out.[12]
The War of Spanish Succession and The Great Northen War inherently changed the balance of power of Europe. The Spanish Succession saw France under Louix XIV become a second-tier power with Great Britian and Austria taking its place, and we also begin to see the rise of Prussia. The Great Northern War was a struggle for supremacy for Eastern Europe, where we see the fall of the Swedish Empire, and the establishment of Imperial Russia under Tsar Peter I. The historiography on both wars is extensive in terms of the variety of themes, such as individual battles, campaigns, leaders, or the character of warfare in the period. However, there are very few works purely dedicated to analyzing or giving a full narrative history of either war. A big reason for this is simply due to the enormous scale of both conflicts which involved many different theatres and states. This makes it difficult to account for all the belligerents involved unless you have a large aptitude for many different languages. This is also why the historiography of both wars does not have a plethora of complete narrative accounts in English. There are two works, that do give both wars somewhat of a narrative account, that being John Lynn’s The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714 and Robert Frost’s The Northern Wars 1558 – 1721. However, both Lynn and Frost put these wars into a larger overall narrative, and Lynn mainly writes about the Spanish Succession from a French perspective. Nonetheless, the historiography makes clear that both wars inherently changed the balance of power in Europe.
For many contemporaries and historians, the Spanish Succession has been viewed as a conflict of aggression on behalf of Louis XIV for wanting to put his grandson on the throne of Spain after the death of Carlos II, thus possibly uniting both the French and Spanish crowns. This possibility was unacceptable from the viewpoint of England, Austria (who also had a claim to the Spanish Crown), and the Dutch Republic, thus forming the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV. Yet, Lynn argues that King Louis, ‘had little reasonable choice but to accept the will of Carlos II’, and that it was his failure to convince the Grand Alliance that his goals were purely dynastic that caused the war due to his provocative actions such as sending troops to take over Dutch held posts in the Spanish Netherlands and also claiming that James II was the rightful King of England instead of William III.[13] What possibly could have been a preventable war, turned into a devastating war of attrition that lasted over ten years. While Louis could eventually claim that he achieved his goal of getting his grandson crowned king of Spain, but it left France on the verge of bankruptcy and could no longer claim it’s former hegemonic status in Europe.[14]
In contrast, the Great Northern War was not a dynastic struggle but has been regarded more as a war that was fought over a desire for territorial acquisitions, namely by Russia, Denmark, and Saxony/Poland-Lithuania at the expense of Sweden. Frost, highlights that uniquely for Poland-Lithuania, this war became a civil war for those either backing Sweden or Russia’s candidate for the Polish Crown.[15] The greatest benefactor from the result of the war was certainly Russia, which established its desired port on the Baltic in St. Petersburg, added territory in Livonia, and became a recognized Empire. For Sweden it has maintain its historical significance for the exact opposite results as Russia. It lost its Baltic empire that it had formed in the 17th century, where by 1700 it arguably was considered the strongest state in Europe,[16] but by the conflict’s conclusion it had lost many of its prized territories, was in financial ruin, and saw the death of its warrior king.
Both wars would become to be known to have produced some of the most fascinating military leaders, or what some may call ‘men of genius’, a phrase that has undergone much scrutiny by historians. This is largely due to its tendency to give too much credit or agency to individuals in shaping history. Clausewitz certainly believed that individuals could shape history and especially the battlefield, and he largely cited Napoleon as the epitome of ‘genius’ in On War. In contemporary warfare, it is often easier to discern the influence of military administrative structures on conflict, as the immense technological complexity involved in deploying systems such as carrier strike groups tends to obscure, or even eclipse, the influence of individual generals. However, many historians still highlight the important influence that individual generals had in conflicts during the 18th century.[17] For both contemporaries and historians today, arguably the most famous military leaders of the Spanish Succession and Great Northern War were John Churchill the Duke of Marlborough and King Charles XII of Sweden.
These men have received considerable attention by contemporaries and historians, but there has been considerable debate on their respective military careers. Clausewitz for one, as I will cite later, did not think of Charles XII as a military ‘genius’, this mainly was due to Clausewitz’s view of Charles’s character, as well as downplaying his Russian adversaries. Frost points out however, that the Russian Army that Charles faces was more than just a hoard of barbarians and in fact when Charles won his impressive victory at Narva in 1700, the Russian army he faced had considerable warfare experience since 1660.[18] Charles overall has received high praises from historians such as Bengtsson, as well as earning admiration from a close contemporary in Voltaire. Much of the controversy surrounding Charles’s legacy in his day as well as for present historians was his ultimate decision to invade Russia, which we will explore using the trinity.
Marlborough has also received a lot of praise from many historians such as Chandler and Lynn, the latter considering him to be ‘one of history’s most brilliant commanders’.[19] There are some historians such as Ostwald that downplay his career in favor of highlighting the importance of Marlborough’s Dutch allies and argues that his renowned victories over the course of the war lacked ‘decisiveness’.[20] However, Chandler views Marlborough’s ability to work with his Dutch allies and the highly distinguished general Prince Eugene of Savoy, as a distinguished character trait that adds to Marlborough’s greatness,[21] which is included in one aspect of the trinity we will be discussing.
We must put the era of these wars into context to establish a bridge to our trinity. Both fall neatly into the early modern period in Europe between 1688 – 1748, were states and armies were going through a period of centralization and professionalization. The character of warfare during this period has been described by Chandler, as a ‘watershed in the history of the development of warfare,’ that helped shape many different aspects in tactics, equipment, and proved, ‘that the prosecution of war and the profession of arms could still be both honorable and relatively civilized’.[22] It was the age of reason, as highlighted by Nolan,[23] and Frost writes in great length how the military revolution evolved differently from that of the west in the Northern Wars. For example, the pike was still used by the Swedish Army, and cavalry continued to play an important role in war, but these factors he argues are not evidence of backwardness, as Swedish historian Peter Englund suggested.[24]
However, it must be made clear that these armies were still not national armies like we see today, but rather still owed their loyalty to kings.[25] Honor as opposed to virtue defined the armies of this period. Officers derived mostly from the noble class, but there was growing opportunity for men to get promoted, especially among the artillery and sapper corps.[26] Thus, in this era many commanders and officers sought gloire in war to enhance their reputation and status, and this was mainly accomplished through demonstrating honor and courage in battle.[27] In turn this would also enhance your monarch’s prestige and glory. However, this period has also been labeled as a time of ‘limited’ warfare, not necessarily in terms of goals, but rather its limited capacity to wage ‘total war’ due to the limitation of logistics. [28] This caused many of the wars of this period to be bogged down in wars of attrition, traditionally defined by siege warfare. One of the main arguments against Marlborough’s reputation as a great battlefield commander is that he only fought five great battles, but to make up for it, he also took over thirty enemy fortresses.[29] You could still achieve gloire by taking a large fort but this did not stop some generals, especially Marlborough and Charles XII, from trying to take the war to the battlefield, where it was believed that a decisive victory could not only end the war more quickly, but also enhance the gloire of your sovereign along with your own career. As we will see, both Marlborough and Charles XII were certainly men of their time, and the success or failure in battle was at the forefront of many contemporaries’ perception, regardless how the battle played out from an overall strategic standpoint. This era was clearly different from the character of warfare that Clausewitz experienced during the Napoleonic wars, where there was large conscription of armies, siege warfare was limited, and logistical concerns were not as paramount. However, as we will see, his concept of the trinity can still be applied to this era of warfare and leaders.
It’s time for evaluation of these battles and men, structured in our ‘fascinating trinity.’ Passion being first up. Marlborough and Charles XII had similar but also distinct personalities which in turn affected strategic objectives and the morale of the armies they led. Perhaps Marlborough’s greatest strength was his charisma, which ‘extended far beyond the purely military environment,’[30] thus enabling him to navigate the politics of the Grand Alliance. This charisma went hand in hand with his immense ambition, where throughout his life he sought ‘wealth, power and social position’.[31] This ambition certainly played a role in his battle seeking mentality, but in the case of Blenheim, as we will discuss later, had more strategic motives.
Charles XII had certainly both these traits as well, but since he was already king, his ambition was not necessarily due to the desire for power. He was ambitious in the sense to secure his realm from invasion and pursue the enemy until their ultimate surrender. While many historians have portrayed Charles as irrational in pursuit of victory, his personality was more stoic in nature.[32] He was a severely devout Christian and even refused to drink alcohol after 1699, except on two other occasions, one being on his way back home from Turkey, to disguise his identity as, ‘every child knew King Charles drank nothing but water’.[33] His faith would guide him along with his army’s sense of purpose.
Lastly, as cited by many historians, both Marlborough and Charles XII embodied courage, wisdom, and foresight.[34] These traits certainly helped them achieve victory after victory. Both men displayed courage by leading their troops in the heat of battle, an act that strengthened the morale of their armies. However, for Charles, this would come back to bite him during the Poltava campaign as we will discuss in chance/probability. Wisdom and foresight were neatly installed in both men. It was said of Charles XII that, ‘Whatever he learned, saw, or did remained with him for life.’[35] Marlborough’s foresight was legendary, as he ‘was famous for being at the critical place at the critical time.’[36]
However, in the realm of chance/probability, there are many things that even these strong personality traits cannot overcome. This point in the trinity seems to have impacted Charles XII in more devastating ways at Poltava than for Marlborough at Blenheim. His loss at Poltava is mainly viewed as inevitable and was a ludicrous plan to invade Russia. However, if there had not been an extremely abnormally cold winter, which took the lives of 4,000 men even before the battle took place,[37] the probability of victory would have been very different. The most damaging strike of chance came though when Charles XII was struck by a bullet on the foot on his birthday during the early stages of the siege of Poltava.[38] This ended up incapacitating him and he was unable to lead his troops in his most important battle to date. He contracted a dangerous fever and was forced to be carried on a litter during Poltava. This severely affected the coordination and the order of battle to the point where his General Rehnskiöld said in the aftermath, ‘Would to God our Gracious King not been wounded, for then it had never gone as it did’.[39] The view that Poltava’s outcome could have been different if Charles had been able take his ‘proper place’ is shared by historian Bengtsson.[40]
Chance and probability seemed to favor Marlborough during his march to the Danube. Weather seemed to be a non-factor, and due to his superior planning along with the help of his quartermaster Cardonnel, his invasion into Bavaria went mainly un-hindered. For example, waiting for every soldier at Heidelberg was a brand-new pair of shoes.[41] This is not to say that Charles and his staff did not thoroughly plan for their invasion, but rather they also were struck by the unpredictably slow pace of their reserve baggage train led by General Lewenhaupt from Riga. He only traveled 131 miles in a month, ‘a speed which would have allowed an oriental caravan to make rings round them.’[42] As a comparison, Marlborough was able to march 20,000 men 250 miles in 5 weeks.[43] The slow pace of the baggage train would not allow it to reach Charles intact, as it made them vulnerable to Russian forces, and they lost a battle that left much of their needed supplies behind.
The tactic of surprise was used by both Marlborough at Blenheim and Charles XII at Poltava. However, yet again Marlborough’s imagination went according to plan, so well in fact, that they moved under the cover of darkness on Blenheim and forced the French to give battle, completely shocking French command.[44] Unlike Charles XII, his goal of moving under the cover of darkness and capture the Russian redoubts was blundered by the lack of coordination, enabling the Russians to spot them at day break and prepare for battle. To make matters worse, because they wanted to move quickly, they only brought three cannon to counter the Russians 102 cannon, thus giving the troops no heavy support in their advance.[45] As you can see, chance/probability can drastically shape the destiny of battles, no matter how well thought out a campaign may be.
Now finally the point of reason. One of the biggest contrasts between Marlborough and Charles XII in this respect was the political position of each individual and the type of governments they had participated in. Marlborough was simply the commander of the Grand Alliance, where he was restricted constantly by other members of the alliance, parliament, and the Monarch. He had to carefully plan the Danube campaign in secret from his superiors because he knew they would not support it and can be classified as a ‘rule-defying march to the Danube’.[46] In contrast, Charles XII was the absolute Monarch of Sweden where he had only ‘God’ and his ‘conscience’ to contend with.[47] This allowed Charles to always have the final say, but of course at Poltava, he had to rely more on his subordinates judgment rather than his own due to the injury.
Was the strategic logic for both campaigns sound? Was Blenheim really a success or decisive? Was Poltava an unnecessary risk? The point of reason would argue that both battles/campaigns were sound strategically. Marlborough knew that a march into Bavaria was necessary to stop the Franco – Bavarian army from marching on Vienna. The victory at Blenheim knocked France’s main ally, Bavaria, out of the war and saved the Grand Alliance from ruin by keeping Austria in the war. The march on Moscow, can seem irrational, but historian Robert Frost, states that ‘Charles’s strategy was undoubtedly risky, it was not the work of a madman or an aggressive psychopath.’[48] He knew that a temporary peace or cease fire with Russia would not evaporate the Russian threat to his realm, so he went for the kill shot. However, the fate of chance played a larger role in his defeat at Poltava, rather than failure in the points of passion, or reason. Perhaps, only in hindsight, we could say his four years campaigning in Poland-Lithuania to dethrone Augustus the Strong, led to his actual failure. However, this strategy was sound too, as Charles knew if he could end the threat of Augustus, he could then use his candidate on the throne as an ally against Russia. He was successful in this goal of dethronement, but by chance again the reinforcements from Poland-Lithuania did not arrive in time, and the four years gave Russia time to reform their army so that they would be better prepared to fight Charles.
The Trinity showed us how all three points played a major role in both Blenheim and Poltava, even though the context, environment, and actors were different. We just briefly went over some examples in both battles, but there are plenty more that could be drawn up to make our case even further. Clausewitz considered Marlborough a man of ‘genius’, but not Charles XII, because he perceived his character as irrational.[49] However, through our analysis using the trinity, we were able to flesh out that it had more to do with poor chance than anything else. Both battles could be classified as decisive, the loss at Poltava for Charles XII ended his Swedish Empire, and victory at Blenheim for Marlborough, saved the Grand Alliance from destruction. While this may be debated, Clausewitz’s ‘fascinating trinity’ should be one of the tools for military historians to help guide our judgment of the complex art of warfare and On War will continue to be useful in some capacity for leaders in conflict.
Bibliography
Bellinger, Vanya Eftimova. Marie Von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of on War. Oxford University Press 2016.
Bengtsson, Frans Gunnar, and Naomi Walford. The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697-1718. Macmillan 1960.
Chandler, David G. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough. Batsford 1976.
Chandler, David G., Christopher L. Scott, and James Falkner. Blenheim Preparation: The English Army on the March to the Danube; Collected Essays. Spellmount 2004.
Clausewitz, Carl von, Michael Howard, Peter Paret, Bernard Brodie, and Rosalie West. On War. Princeton University Press 1984.
Englund, Peter. The Battle of Poltava: The Birth of the Russian Empire. Gollancz 1992.
Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721. Longman 2000.
Lynn, John A. Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715. Cambridge University Press 1997.
Lynn, John A. The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714. Longman 1999.
Nolan, Cathal J. The Allure of Battle: A History of how Wars have been Won and Lost. 1st ed. Oxford University Press USA – OSO 2017.
Ostwald, Jamel., “The “Decisive” Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare,” The Journal of Military History 64, no. 3 (2000): 649–677, doi:10.2307/120864.
Strachan, Hew (Hew Francis Anthony), Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Hew Strachan, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. 1st ed. Oxford University Press 2007. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232024.001.0001.
Strachan, Hew. Carl Von Clausewitz’s on War: A Biography. Atlantic Books 2008.
Voltaire, and Michael F. O. Jenkins. Lion of the North: Charles XII of Sweden. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1981.
[1] Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Marie Von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of on War (Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 11
[2] Hew Strachan, Carl Von Clausewitz’s on War: A Biography (Atlantic Books, 2008), chap. Introduction. Also, in the introduction Strachan points out how different leaders in history such as Stalin, Hitler, Lenin, all had their own opinions on Clausewitz.
[3] (Strachan 2008, p. 2) shows how military leaders such as Powell and Summers use the trinity to explain Americas struggles in Vietnam
[4] Hew (Hew Francis Anthony) Strachan et al., , Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2007), 74. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232024.001.0001
[5] In (Strachan 2008, IX–XI ) discusses the difficulties of translating On War due to language and particular editions, see also p.102
[6] (Strachan and others 2007, p. 77)
[7] (Strachan and others 2007, p. 79)
[8] Carl von Clausewitz et al., , On War (Princeton University Press, 1984), 89
[9] Strachan et al., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, 79
[10] (Strachan and others 2007, p. 89)
[11] (Strachan and others 2007, p. 86)
[12] (Strachan and others 2007, p. 77)
[13]John A. Lynn, , The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714 (Longman, 1999), 268–9. Also, Lynn in his footnote on p. 269 highlights that historians and experts disagree on whether these actions by Louis were arrogant or reasonable.
[14](Lynn 1999, p. 359-61)
[15] (Frost 2000, p. 264)The Northern Wars : War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721 (Longman, 2000), 264
[16] Peter Englund, , The Battle of Poltava : The Birth of the Russian Empire (Gollancz, 1992), 13
[17] See Lynn 1999, Wars of Louis XIV p. 272, Chandler 2004, Blenheim Preparation p. 13, and Frost 2000, Northern Wars pg. 276.
[18] (Frost 2000, p. 233), also cites Voltaire discrediting the Russians in p. 231-32
[19] (Lynn 1999, p. 272)
[20] Jamel Ostwald, , “The “Decisive” Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare,” The Journal of Military History 64, no. 32000: 649–677, doi:10.2307/120864
[21] (Chandler, Scott, and Falkner 2004, Blenheim Preparation p. 200-02) Lynn also highlights his character and working relationship with Prince Eugene as key to success in The Wars of Louie XIV p. 273
[22] David G. Chandler, , The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (Batsford, 1976), 11 & 23
[23] Cathal J. Nolan, , The Allure of Battle: A History of how Wars have been Won and Lost, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press USA – OSO, 2017), chap. 5
[24] (Frost 2000, p. 16-17)
[25] (Nolan 2017, p. 109)
[26] (Nolan 2017, p. 107)
[27] John A. Lynn, , Giant of the Grand Siècle : The French Army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 251
[28]Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough, p. 13
[29] (Lynn 1999, 273)
[30] David G. Chandler et al., , Blenheim Preparation : The English Army on the March to the Danube ; Collected Essays (Spellmount, 2004), p. 201
[31] (Chandler, Scott, and Falkner 2004, p. 203)
[32] Frans Gunnar Bengtsson and Naomi Walford, , The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697-1718 (Macmillan, 1960), p. 343
[33] (Bengtsson and Walford 1960, p. 39)
[34] For assessments of Marlborough’s leadership, foresight, and personal authority, see David Chandler, Blenheim Preparation; John Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714; On Charles XII’s courage, strategic judgment, and personal influence on his army, see Robert I. Frost, The Northern Wars, 1558–1721. Contemporary admiration is reflected in Voltaire, History of Charles XII.
[35] (Bengtsson and Walford 1960, p. 14)
[36] (Lynn 1997, p. 315)
[37] Frost, The Northern Wars : War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721, p. 288
[38] Voltaire and Michael F. O. Jenkins, , Lion of the North : Charles XII of Sweden (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981), p. 129
[39] Bengtsson and Walford, The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697-1718, p. 353
[40] (Bengtsson and Walford 1960, p. 360)
[41] Chandler et al., Blenheim Preparation : The English Army on the March to the Danube ; Collected Essays, p. 224
[42] (Bengtsson and Walford 1960, p. 292)
[43] (Lynn 1999, p. 287)
[44] (Chandler, Scott, and Falkner 2004, p. 238)
[45] Englund, The Battle of Poltava : The Birth of the Russian Empire, p. 95
[46] (Chandler, Scott, and Falkner 2004, p. 218)
[47] (Bengtsson and Walford 1960, p. 6)
[48] Frost, The Northern Wars : War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721, p. 288
[49] Clausewitz et al., On War, p. 111
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